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The Uncertainty of Intelligence and the Entropy of Threats

In Part 2 of this series, we will explore the dimensions of information uncertainty, entropy and negentropy, superlinear defence-in-depth, latent space and threat intelligence as a decoding device for time-bound information.
The Uncertainty of Intelligence and the Entropy of Threats

In Part 1 of this series, we started to lay out the problem space and drew some diėgrams to get a better grasp of them.

However, by merely looking at threat actionability zones we are obviating a very important aspect of threat management: the passing of time. Timely action can be the difference between pwned and not-pwned, between 5 million customer records held to ransom and nothing more than a noticeable event in your perimeter.

In Part 2 of this series, we will explore some eideons that I hope will contribute to developing a new understanding of the mechanics of threat information, intel, hunting and detection.

Threat Intelligence and the Problem of Time

Regardless of the strategic approach you choose to realize the value of threat intelligence, you implicitly work with three different time horizons: threats that could impact us (the future), what can impact us right now based on our attack surface (the present) and what has impacted us already (whether knowingly or unknowingly, the past).


The world is full of potential cyber threats, this doesn't mean they constitute likely threats to your business. Oh! I can now hear some of you going "That's right! So you are now going to talk about the impact and likelihood risk matrix", ehem… no. That would be just repeating what everyone else out there vociferates like automaton robots.

There's nothing wrong with the "likelihood & impact" matrix by the way, but the likelihood of some threat impacting business operations is merely a derived value, the result of a deliberative process that has already decided the final likelihood score. How can you even arrive at that when most Cyber Ops teams struggle to capture the meaningful relationship between potential threats, their actionability gradients and the attack paths they enable in the environment?

Behind this confusion lies the concept of defense-in-depth: interspersed layers of defensive controls like a castle-and-moat model. If one layer is breached, there are additional layers to mitigate risks and prevent unauthorized access.


There is, however, one missing piece in the concept of defence-in-depth. When we think of layers we evoke spatial references, but forget about the temporal layers: past, present and future.


When considering temporal layers on top of our actionability zones we get the concept of threat horizons. A threat horizon brings in the experience of change because the asymmetry of time brings us closer to the reality of irreversible structural changes. If things weren’t changing, it is unclear how we would experience a sense of time passing.

If we had to depict this with a diėgram, using the actionability diėgrams from Part 1, it would look like this (yeah... I know you know I love Excalidraw):


As we saw in Part 1 of this series, one way of thinking about the threats that can/do impact your organization is in terms of their actionability. We formalized this concept in two possible definitions (because we like to embrace ambiguity), here's one of them:

the ability for an organization to articulate decision-making processes based on available information, to direct the actions required for mitigating risk exposure to cyber threats.

The term "actionability" in this context refers to the degree to which a threat that poses a realistic risk to the business can be addressed effectively by an organization. I know what you are thinking: but Diego, you are not addressing the very core of what a "realistic risk" is, aren't we in danger of falling into a circular definition? (i.e. actionability is defined in terms of that which poses a realistic risk; a realistic risk is that which by its own virtue has been identified as actionable)

🔍🤔Well, perhaps this will be disappointing to you but, I am not trying to tell you what constitutes a realistic risk for your business, that's not my job. I am trying to help you understand the ways in which you can produce a threat-informed pipeline of work that is meaningful for your CyberOps. I don't sell those magic pills many vendors promise. In fact, I'm not selling you anything ;) We are co-creating here, I'm helping you carve new patterns of thought that I hope will inspire better ways to solve the usual problems.

Actionability does not care if the threat is within the realm of unrelated possible threats "out there", it only cares about those threats that are likely applicable to your digital landscape given the state of your attack surface. We are not asking ourselves what is the impact and likelihood here. The question we are trying to answer is: should you do something about itcan you do something about it and did you do something about it?

Just because there is a likely threat, it doesn't mean you will do something about it. Even more, just because there is a likely threat, it doesn't mean you can do something about it. Small businesses with very limited budgets certainly cannot afford to do something about every likely threat out there.

Allow me to rephrase the ideas above in terms of could, should, have:


When presented this way, the actionability zones become more clear. There are threats that you could do something about, but this doesn't mean all of them are relevant enough to deserve your attention and resource allocation. However, a subset of the latter are those threats you should definitively do something about, i.e. if you are running Ivanti Sentry and are aware of CVE-2023-38035 with a vulnerability severity rating of 9.8, you should definitively allocate resources to patch, protect and respond to threats in that area.

Despite the above, not all the threats you should do something about are effectively addressed. The reason is simple: there is not an infinite pool of resources at your disposal. You have to prioritize, inevitably. This of course means you will end up doing something about Ivanti Sentry CVE-2023-38035, but may not do something immediately about the 30% of employees who so quickly fell for that phishing simulation, once again.

It does not mean you won't do something about that phishing simulation results in the near future, it just means you have de-prioritized that threat in your present horizon. You may send those employees to their tenth round of phishing training with some boring slides, with a caveat though: only if your organization sustains the awareness about that threat and it doesn't fade away into the past horizon.

There is an important question here, which goes to the heart of this article series: how do we harness the power of our threat intelligence pipeline to maximize the probability of focusing on the right threats? Or to put it bluntly in negative terms: how do we avoid wasting resources on irrelevant threats?

To achieve effective resource allocation for this informational problem, we need to find a way to develop synergistic relationships at every stage of the information processing pipeline between the interconnected systems that consume its outputs and the stakeholders that make decisions based on the data.

One way to make our temporal and spatial layered defences more effective is by building for a specific type of synergistic effect called superlinearity. Amongst other properties, this effect is an aspect of what I've been calling adaptive defence.

Let's explore what synergistic defence-in-depth means in the next few sections, and how can we draw from this idea to engineer better threat intelligence pipelines.

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